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1.  Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to examine various policy responses to the global financial 
crisis  of  2007-2009.  The  global  financial  crisis  of  2008-09  has  several  stages 
differentiated in its scope and severity.    It started as the bust of subprime mortgages 
and sharp declines in securitized and re-securitized those mortgages in the United States. 
Then it spread to other countries, to other securities markets, to financial products at 
large, to foreign exchange markets, and to the real activities of the global economies.   
 
The first clear market warning came in August 2007 when interest rate spreads suddenly 
rose.    With small seemingly sporadic fires flared up and policy measures were applied 
from  August  2007  to  September  2008.    Before  the  failure  of  Lehman  Brothers  on 
September 15, 2008, the problems among financial institutions, especially investment 
banks, were obvious and fire flared up occasionally (August and November 2007; and 
March 2008), but policy responses to put out fire were effective.    Policy responses 
during  this  period  were,  mainly  conventional,  but  some  modest  unconventional, 
including arrangement of a rescue merger of Bear Stearns.    Problems appeared to be 
limited to US and European investment banks that touched toxic assets. 
 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11, and that changed the 
financial markets completely.    After the Lehman Brothers failed, spreads skyrocketed 
and prices of many securities plummeted. Several key markets, such as commercial 
papers, virtually disappeared. Several large financial institutions in the United States 
and Europe became undercapitalized if not insolvent. This was big explosion and fire in 
the United States and the fire spread to other countries and real side of the economy. 
Some European banks were nationalized and resolved, and US Treasury injected capital 
into  several  banks.  Central  banks  acted as  the lender of last  resort  and flooded the 2 
 
markets with liquidity. Many kinds of unconventional monetary policy were applied in 
the United States and other countries. The interest rate spreads declined markedly after 
May 2009 and came down to the level of July 2007 by September 2009.     
 
The  paper  will  describe  how  events  have  unfolded  in  the  United  States  and  how 
conventional  and  unconventional  policies  have  been  applied,  and  then  discuss 
effectiveness of those policies.   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the timeline of crisis, 
describing  several  important  policy  responses  to  various  shocks  and  market 
developments. Section 3 provides assessments of policy responses to the global crisis. 
Conventional  and  unconventional  monetary  policy  will  be  examined;  quantitative 
easing of the BOJ in 2001-2006 and current credit easing of the Federal Reserve will be 
compared; and bank restructuring efforts in the crisis will be discussed in light of the 
previous crisis and the literature. Assessment of policy (or a lack thereof) leading up to 
the  Lehman  Brothers  failure  will  be  examined.  Section  4  discusses  remaining 
challenges for the United States and the rest of the world in order not to repeat the crisis 
of 2007-2009 in the future. The paper will argue that it is important to establish an 
internationally-coordinated,  publicly-supported  (temporary  nationalization),  orderly 
resolution  mechanism  for  troubled  large,  complex,  internationally-active  financial 
institutions.   
 
 
2.  Timeline 
2.1.  Interest Rate Spreads and CDS   
Two kinds of spreads are shown in Figure 1. The sample period is from July 2007 (the 
beginning of the crisis) to September 2009 (end of the crisis?).    In the crisis, the spread 
between 3 month London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and Overnight indexed swap 
(OIS)  has  been  a  popular  measure  for  counterparty  risk  and  liquidity  premium.
1 
Another measure  of risk  is the TED spread , defined by the difference between the 
LIBOR and the treasury bill (risk free) rate. The TED spread is  a direct measure of 
credit risk of large commercial banks that participates in the offshore interbank market. 
In general the two measures are highly correlated, so that the counterparty risk—that is, 
a bank does not trust another bank as a counterparty—was a major cause of turmoil in 
                                                   
1  Both Libor and OIS are influenced by expectations about future interest rate movement but taking 
the difference, it is cancelled out in the spread.         3 
 
the financial markets in the global crisis.
2  The credit-worthiness of large American and 
European banks and investment banks was  at the heart of the crisis .
3  Occasional 
deviations between TED  and Libor-OIS may likely be due to  emergence of liquidity 
problem. 
 
Figure 2 shows the movements of credit default swap (CDS) premia of major banks. 
This is a direct measure of the default risk of individual banks.  Collectively, they 
should have high correlation with the Libor-OIS spread that measures counterparty risk.   
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
2.2.  Pre-Lehman 
The initial stage of the burst of the US housing markets started in late 2006, but severity 
that would ensue was not fully obvious then. As housing prices continued to fall, some 
financial institutions started to experience shortage in liquidity and experience losses in 
its asset values.    In the first half of 2007, the financial institutions that had accumulated 
inventories of housing-related securities with leverage had to unwind positions to obtain 
liquidity  with  substantial  losses.  Financial  assets  globally  were  sold  by  investment 
banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions in order to repay borrowed funds and 
to accumulate cash positions for possible withdrawal of funds—a phenomenon called 
―deleveraging.‖ Through the deleveraging process,  the downward pressure of prices 
spilled over to equities, bonds, and other financial assets in major countries in emerging 
market countries around world. 
 
Between July 2007 and August  2008, there were three spikes in  the spreads  (more 
pronounced in the TED spread): August/September 2007, December 2007, and March 
2008.    The  timings  of  spikes  roughly  corresponded  to  the  suspension  of  the  fund 
withdrawal by BNP Paribas on August 9, 2007 and Northern Rock crisis on September 
14, 2007; Large write-downs among investment banks’ quarterly reports in December 
2007; and the rescue merger of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase with Federal Reserve 
assistance in March 2008.     
                                                   
2  Taylor (2009) argues that it was primarily counter-party risk rather than liquidity, since the 
Libor-OIS spread highly correlates with Libor-repo spread which measures counterparty risk more 
directly. Here, the TED spread is used to make the same argument. 
3  In the aftermath of the banking crisis of November 1997 in Japan, the so-called Japan premium 
increased sharply.  Western banks demanded higher interest rate on Japanese banks who wanted to 
borrow the US dollar. See Ito and Harada (2004, 2005) for the Japanese experiences of the banking 
crisis from 1997-2003.    4 
 
 
The both spreads stayed between 50 and 100 basis points from the beginning of May to 
end-July.    In August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas temporarily stopped withdrawal of three 
affiliated  mutual  funds,  due  to  difficulties  in  calculating  asset  values  of  subprime 
mortgage-related securities.    This event made it clear to all market participants that the 
problem was deeper and widespread.    Market spreads jumped. On August 9 and 10, the 
TED spread jumped from 50 basis point to 100 basis points, and the Libor-OIS spread 
jumped from 10 basis point to 50 basis points. The jump was attributable to the BNP 
Paribas shock.    The spread continued to increase. The TED spread peaked at 240 basis 
points on August 20; the Libor-OIS spread increased to 80-90 basis points in September 
2007.     
 
The TED and Libor-OIS spreads decreased until end-October, but started to increase in 
November.    By  mid-December  the  TED  was  elevated  to  200  basis  points,  while 
Libor-OIS spread rose to 100 basis points. 
 
Although various spreads started to show a widening trend, solvency of a large financial 
institutions were not yet seriously questioned. However, the Federal Reserve became 
concerned enough about declining liquidity in the market and softening of the economic 
activities,  it  started  to  lower  the  interest  rate  in  September  2007  followed  by 
establishment of Term Auction Facility (TAF) on December 12, 2007.    The policy rate 
of the United States was lowered to 3.00% by end-January.    It meant a 225 basis point   
decline in 6 months.    With these aggressive cuts in the interest rate and usage of TAF, 
the financial markets seemed to have regained stability.   
 
As soon as TAF was announced, the two spreads started to decline.    As TAF auction 
were planned and implemented, with strong messages coming out from Federal Reserve 
in that TAF would continue as long as necessary, the two spreads continue to decline. 
The effect of announcement of TAF seems to be clear in reversing the trend in the TED 
and Libor-OIS spreads. 
 
The CDS shows a very gradual increase from July 2007 to March 2008. The two peaks 
in August/September 2007 and December 2007, which are evident in the two interest 
rate spreads, are barely visible in CDS. Except for Capital One, all spreads move very 
close to each other with a slightly increase trend until March 2008. This implies that 
default risk of large investment banks was judged not so high until March 2008.   5 
 
 
The rescue merger of Bear Stearns in March 9, 2008 was another shock to the financial 
world.    JP Morgan Chase agreed to purchase Bear Stearns on March 16 with $2 a share 
(a week later, revised to $10 a share), and the Federal Reserve guaranteed $29 billion 
for  possible  losses  from  Bear  Stearns  assets  that  JP  Morgan  Chase  purchased.  The 
facility of Bear Stearns assets were created in which the first $1 billion loss would be 
assumed by JP Morgan Chase, and the rest by Federal Reserve. The loss guarantee, or 
sweetener  for  the  takeover,  was  unusual  and  surprising.    It  was  justified  as  an 
emergency measure to rescue Bear Stearns that experienced sudden and acute shortage 
in liquidity.    (The Bear Stearns CDS premium did not show any remarkable movement 
until its merger—not shown in Figure 2.) 
 
In addition to the merger assistance, the Federal Reserve created two new facilities: 
Term  Securities  Lending  Facility  (TSLF)  on  March  11  and  Primary  Dealer  Credit 
Facility (PDCF) on March 16, 2008. In addition, the policy target rate was lowered by 
75 basis points to 2.25% on March 18, and lowered again by 25 basis points to 2% on 
April  30.    As  liquidity  for  several  investment  banks  became  dried  up,  the  Federal 
Reserve recognized the need to deliver liquidity to them and PDCF was the answer.   
 
These  measures  seemed  to  be  enough  to  calm  the  market,  although  it  took  until 
end-April to lower the TED spread below 150 basis points. Amid the crisis of Bear 
Stearns,  CDS  spreads  of  Morgan  Stanley  and  Goldman  Sachs  increased  more  than 
others. However, the increase was short-lived (compared to the November-December 
episode). 
 
On March 19, in response to tightening housing finance, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were  encouraged  by  the  regulator  to  increase  their  guaranteeing  mortgage-backed 
securities, via lowering capital requirements.    However, this contributed to financial 
fragility of the two Government Sponsored enterprises (GSE) themselves. The GSEs are 
federally created institutions but privately-owned.  Although the GSEs liabilities are 
not explicitly guaranteed by the government, their bonds (agency bonds) are believed to 
be implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. The yields of those bonds are only 
slightly above the corresponding Treasuries. In fact, many of them are held by foreign 
government as foreign reserves. When the financial soundness of the two GSEs became 
questioned  in  the  market  after  June  2009,  concerns  were  quietly  expressed  by  the 
foreign  government  that  any  hint  of  default  may  result  in  the  crash  of  the  dollar. 6 
 
Secretary Paulson requested government funds to support the two GSEs if necessary. 
Eventually, on September 7, the two GSEs were placed under Federal conservatorship. 
Implicit guarantee became explicit guarantee. Although Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac 
were in crisis during the summer to the first week of September, TED, Libor-OIS, and 
CDS reacted in any measurable way.     
 
During  the  pre-Lehman  period,  the  scope  of  the  problem  was  limited  to  US  and 
European investment banks that created CDOs out of subprime mortgages and investors 
who bought those securities from them. US dollar liquidity was needed for European 
investment banks in order to settle contracts and to deleverage their positions.    The 
Federal  Reserve  established  swap  lines  with  ECB  and  Swiss  National  Bank  on 
December 12 (the same day TAF was established), with ceiling amount of $20 billion 
and $4 billion, respectively.    This shows an unusual situation in that European central 
banks felt the need for dollar liquidity for their domestic financial institutions. The swap 
lines later were increased on March 11, and would be expanded to other central banks 
and uncapped after the Lehman shock.   
 
The Federal Reserve lowered the interest rate five times between September 2007 and 
January 2008 by 225 basis points, and another 75 basis points in March 2008, in order 
to  help  the  collapsing  housing  market  and  in  anticipation  of  slower  growth  due  to 
collapsing housing market. However, the ECB and BOJ did not lower the interest rate 
during this period.    The Bank of England started to lower the rate in December 2007. 
 
In the pre-Lehman period, Asian financial institutions had little damages, and the Asian 
financial  markets  and  currencies  remained  stable.  In  fact,  there  was  a  sense  of 
Schadenfreude in Asia. All the problems and policy advices they received during the 
Asian currency crisis and Japanese banking crisis in 1997-98 should now be directed to 
the United States and, to lesser extent, to Europe.   
 
2.3.  Post-Lehman, US 
Figure 2 shows a gradual increase in CDS for all major institutions from end-May.    In 
August and September 2008, financial vulnerabilities of several large investment banks 
became obvious. By September 12, the CDS for Morgan Stanley reached the level that 
was experienced immediately after the Bear Stearns.    CDS for other institutions had 
been rising, but the level on September 12 was not so alarming considering what they 
had gone through in March.    The TED and Libor-OIS spreads were stable in the week 7 
 
preceding the Lehman crash. .   
 
On September 10, Lehman Brothers announced $3.9 Billion losses, and on September 
12,  Moody’s  and  S&P  threatened  to  downgrade  Lehman  Brothers.    Intense 
negotiations on how to rescue Lehman Brothers took place among the Treasury, Federal 
Reserve, and major financial institutions. Bank of America and Barclays had expressed 
interest in purchasing Lehman, but they had demanded government assistance in loss 
guarantee, similar to the one given to JP Morgan when it purchased Bear Stearns in 
March.    The federal assistance was not offered and both Bank of America and Barclays 
declined to purchase Lehman Brothers.    Bank of America purchased Merrill  Lynch 
instead. 
 
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 on September 15, 2008, which sent a shock wave 
to the financial centers in the rest of the world. Not-so-remarkable levels of the two 
spreads and CDS other than Morgan Stanley (which reached 250 on September 12) and 
Lehman  Brothers  (which  reached  700  on  September  12)  meant  that  most  market 
participants had expected some sort of a rescue operation. 
 
After Lehman’s filing for Chapter 11, almost all financial markets in the United States 
seized to function properly. In many securities markets, buyers disappeared. The prices 
could  not  be  found.    Crisis  spread  from  investment  banks  to  money  market,  and 
adverse effects also spread to financial institutions in other countries which also put 
great stress on the government when they nationalized troubled financial institutions.   
The Treasury and Federal Reserve needed to pull off all the weapons they had to fight 
the crisis.       
 
AIG debt was downgraded on September 15, for its concentration in providing CDS, 
while CDS for AIG skyrocketed due to heightened fear of who’s next after Lehman.   
Downgrades meant that AIG had to put up large reserves (margin calls), which it did not 
have.    The  Treasury  and  Federal  Reserve  provided  $85  billion  loan  to  AIG,  in 
exchange  for  stakes  in  AIG.    The  loan  would  be  restructured  on  November  10.   
Increasingly, AIG became virtually nationalized as a majority of voting shares would 
become owned by the government.     
 
The Federal Reserve quickly created more facilities to help provide liquidity to various 
types  of  financial  institutions.  On  September  19,  Asset-Backed  Commercial  Paper 8 
 
(ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF) was created.   
This was direct response to the fact that large withdrawal of funds from MMMF started 
to occur in response to that a money market fund experienced to ―break the buck‖ (a 
loss  occurred  to  principal)  on  September  16.    The  MMMFs  hold  large  quantity  of 
commercial papers (CP), and if they liquidate the CPs, then many firms will be driven 
to bankruptcy due to a lack of liquidity and working capital. AMLF was to stop this 
possibility.    In the similar direction to help the commercial paper market, Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) was established on October 7. This opens the possibility 
that Federal Reserve will purchase high-quality CPs, both asset-backed and unsecured, 
outright from issues (via primary dealers).    On October 21, the Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF) was established, under Federal Reserve Act, Section 13 (3).   
(See the discussion on the Governance issue regarding Section 13 (3).)    Under this 
facility, ―the New York Fed will provide senior secured funding to a series of special 
purpose vehicles to facilitate an industry-supported private-sector initiative to finance 
the purchase of eligible assets from eligible investors.‖    On November 25, the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was created.    The facility was to ―help 
market  participants  meet  the  credit  needs  of  households  and  small  business  by 
supporting the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralized by student loans, 
auto  loans,  credit  card  loans,  and  loans  guaranteed  by  the  Small  Business 
Administration (SBA). Under TALF the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would led 
up to $200 billion on a non-recourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed 
by newly  and recently  originated  consumer  and small business  loans. The Treasury 
essentially underwrote the loans so that the Federal Reserve balance sheet from this 
facility  would  be  protected.    This  facility  was  a  policy  response  to  disappearing 
markets of all types of securitized products. So all these ―facilities‖ were created to 
restore market functions in increasingly wider range of financial products.   
 
The  TAF  allotments  were  also  increased  on  September  29.    Goldman  Sachs  and 
Morgan Stanley were allowed to become bank holding companies, so that they can have 
access to Federal Reserve discount window.    It also meant that a principal regulator for 
them is Federal Reserve.     
 
On monetary policy front, the policy rate was cut by 50 basis points to 1.5% on October 
8, in internationally concerted interest cut.    The interest payment on excess reserves 
started on October 9.
4  The policy rate was further cut by 50 basis points to 1% on 
                                                   
4  This may be a reaction to a fact that maintaining the (average) policy rate at the target level had 9 
 
October 29.    On December 16, the Federal Reserve adopted a new policy rate target 
range of 0 – 0.25%.    This is virtually zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), a reminiscent of 
the  Bank  of  Japan  policy  from  1999-August  2000,  and  March  2001  to  2006.  (The 
difference between BOJ quantitative easing and FED credit easing will be discussed in 
the later section.) The Federal Reserve entered the era of ZIRP with unconventional 
monetary policy.   
 
The TED and Libor-OIS spread increased sharply on September 15, in the wake of 
Lehman’s demise, and continued to increase until mid-October. The TED spread peaked 
at 460 basis points, and Libor-OIS at 350 basis points on October 10. CDS for Morgan 
Stanley  shot  up  to  1200  basis  points.  Other  financial  institutions  also  experienced 
elevated  CDS  spread.  The  CDS  became  increasingly  differentiated  among  financial 
institutions. In immediate months after the Lehman’s failure, CDS for Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman  Sachs,  and  Capital  One  remained  high,  followed  by  CitiGroup.  Bank  of 
America and Fells Fargo remained low. After March 2009, CDS for CitiGroup increased 
sharply, while others were on the gradual decline.    CDS for Citi remained higher than 
others until September 2009, when all CDS became below 200 basis points, the level 
before the Lehman’s filing for Chapter 11.     
 
The  TED  and  Libor-OIS  spreads  came  down  to  at  around  100  basis  points  in 
mid-January  2009.  The  deviation  between  the  two  spreads  disappeared.  The  level 
remained  at  around  100  basis  points  until  end-April.    The  two  spreads  started 
distinctive decline in May, becoming lower than 50 basis points in late May. The two 
spreads became less than 20 by end-September, clearly suggesting a normal condition 
(pre-BNP Paribas event) was restored in the liquidity and counterparty risk is concerned. 
The CDS market also shows that the markets now believes the extreme turmoil in the 
financial  markets  is  over,  barring  another  unexpected  shock.  However,  these 
assessments should be qualified that the calmness has been attained partly due to ZIPR, 
all those ―facilities‖ and other policy measures. 
 
2.4.  International Responses 
(a) Liquidity support and asset purchase 
Although  the  origin  of  the  problem  was  in  the  United  States,  toxic  assets  were 
distributed by European investment banks and bought by European investors. US dollar 
swap lines were introduced as early as December 2007 with ECB ($20 billion) and 
                                                                                                                                                     
become increasingly difficult due to heterogeneity of market participants.     10 
 
Swiss National Bank ($4billion). (Later they were expanded in amount and eventually 
uncapped.)    This was a first sign of the crisis spreading from the United States to the 
rest of the world.   
 
Some European banks had large exposure to toxic assets (subprime related securities, 
and other risky securitized assets). Other western European banks  had  exposures  to 
Hungary  and  Latvia  where  the  economies  went  into  difficulties  as  capital  outflows 
persisted.  A  large  multi-national  banking  group,  Fortis  had  difficulties  in  its  assets 
deterioration, and its Dutch operations had to be first injected with capital in September 
and then nationalized by the Netherland government in October 2008.    The French 
government  recapitalized Dexis  at the end of September 2008, in  cooperatioin  with 
Belgium and Luxembourg. 
 
In the first half of October, many banks became financially fragile worldwide and many 
countries announced comprehensive rescue packages. (See Penetta (2009) for the list.) 
The  concerted  action  was  partly  due  to  coordination  under  the  G7  on  October  10 
establishing guidelines for assistance to systemically relevant institutions.   
 
During the month of October, flight to quality has been intensified, and the US dollar 
appreciated against Euro as investors regarded US dollar as safe haven and US financial 
institutions  accelerated  deleveraging  (repatriating  to  US  headquarters).    US  dollars 
appreciated against almost all currencies but one, the Japanese yen. The yen appreciated 
due  to  unwinding  carry  trades—repaying  the  borrowed  yen  for  investing  in 
high-yielding currencies, such as Australian dollar.   
 
Panetta et al. (2009) provides a comprehensive survey on the various measures (capital 
injection, liability guarantee, asset purchase, and asset guarantees) of eleven countries. 
They report that a total of €5 trillion euro has been committed and €2 trillion has been 
spent  in  the  eleven  countries.    Outlay  of  UK  assistance  reached  44%  of  GDP;  the 
Netherlands  17%;  US  7.4%;  and  Japan  0.1%.  Details  are  reproduced  as  Table  1.  
Panetta et al. (2009) conclude that when the bank CDS premia are used, then the market 
has  regained  stability  (as  of  end-May  2009)  and  attribute  this  to  the  government 
interventions mentioned above.     
 




With heightened risk aversion, institutional investors pulled their funds out of emerging 
market  economies.    Some  institutional  investors  rushed  to  sell  assets  in  emerging 
markets to repatriate to US and European headquarters to that they can gain liquidity—a 
part  of  deleveraging.    Those  countries  that  relied  on  capital  inflows  for  real-sector 
investment  suddenly  faced  with  shortage  of  US  dollars  and  Euros  to  pay  back 
borrowings from foreign investors. This is a familiar problem that has been repeated 
many times in the recent history: Mexico in 1994, Asian countries in 1997-98, Russia in 
1998, Brazil in 1999-2000, Argentina in 2001-02, to name just large ones. IMF suddenly 
became busy received many requests for assistance.     
 
The  current  (as  of  September  30)  borrowers  of  IMF  loans  under  SBA  between 
September and December of 2008, included Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, and Latvia.. 
Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Romania, Serbia joined the list in 2009.    Poland agreed to 
have a newly created facility, flexible credit line, FCL   
 
However,  after  the  failure  of  the  Lehman  Brothers,  the  degree  of  risk  aversion 
heightened suddenly, and so many financial institutions became almost insolvent and 
had to be rescued outright, the market was flooded with liquidity but it was not enough 
to calm the market. Many markets became dysfunctional—no buyer, no prices—and the 
Federal Reserve had to expand vastly unconventional measures. Many facilities were 
created to purchase securities and other assets.    The Federal Reserve balance sheets 
quickly doubled. The Treasury, using TARP and other tools, de facto nationalize AIG 
and injected capital to CitiGroup, Bank of America, and other commercial banks.     
 
 
(c) Real Economy 
Financial  shocks  became  widespread  in  various  directions,  US  real  economies 
(production,  consumption,  and  investment),  foreign  exchange  markets,  and  foreign 
countries, both advanced and emerging markets.     
 
Although consumption and investment was softening since the collapse of the housing 
bubble in the United States, the financial troubles further dampened the consumer and 
corporate activities. The GDP growth rate turned negative in third quarter of 2008, but 
the magnitude of decline became more than 5% in both fourth quarter of 2008 and the 
first quarter of 2009—a severe recession.    The Lehman failure and financial turmoil 12 
 
that  ensued  decisively  made  real  activities  to  shrink.    Particularly  hard  hit  was 
high-end of consumer (semi-)durables, such as consumer electronics and automobiles.   
 
The severe recession in the United States meant US imports to decline suddenly, and 
major exporters to the United States to suffer from that. Since high end of consumer 
electronics  and  automobiles  were the first item  that consumers decided to  postpone 
purchases,  imports  to  the  US  from  Japan  and  Germany  declined  disproportionately. 
Japan  experienced  unprecedented  decline  in  industrial  production  and  manufactured 
exports.    Japanese  economic  growth  became  bottom  of  the  G7  countries.  German 
exports declined significantly also for the same reason.   
 
(d) Exchange Rates 
The  large  shock  spilled  over  to  the  foreign  exchange  markets.    The  US  dollar 
appreciated against almost all currencies including Euro, British Pound, and commodity 
based currencies. It was unusual that the currency of crisis-origin country appreciates in 
the midst of the crisis. This was explained by the fact that many troubled institutions 
needed US dollar to settle (dollar-denominated) contracts and to repatriate assets, that is 
exchanging  revenues  from  sale  of  assets  abroad  into  the  US  dollar  to  help  the 
headquarter balance sheet.    The only currency that appreciated against the US dollar 
was the Japanese yen. This was explained by two forces, unwinding of carry trades and 
loss cut by Japanese retail investors in high-yielding currencies that overwhelmed the 
repatriation of US financial institutions.     
 
(e) Japan 
Japan suddenly felt big declines in stock prices, a sharp appreciation in the yen, and 
sudden declines in exports in the fourth quarter of 2008 (and continue into the first 
quarter  of  2009).    The  government  tried  to  stimulate  the  economy  by  introducing 
several fiscal programs.    The policy interest rate being already at 0.5 percent, the Bank 
of Japan could not produce any stimulative measures.    The expanding balance sheet or 
targeting excess reserves that was employed from 2001 to 2006 was not revived this 
time. Japan experienced minus 3 percent quarter-to-quarter growth rate in two quarters 
in a row.  Japanese banks, which had little exposure to toxic assets, started to feel 
pressure in the first quarter of 2009, as stock prices continue to decline and the real 
economy to decline.    Some of them recapitalize themselves from the market, diluting 
existing shareholders. But, they were not in a condition to ask for government capital 




3.  Assessment of Policy Responses 
3.1.  Conventional Monetary Policy 
(a) Policy Rate Cut 
As  explained  in  earlier  section,  only  the  United  States  was  engaged  in  aggressive 
interest rate cut before Lehman’s failure in September 2008. After the September 2008, 
the Bank of England aggressively cut of the interest rate from 5% in September 2008 to 
0.5 percent in March 2009.    ECB cut the interest rate more gradually, from 4% in July 
2007  to  1%  in  May  2009.  The  more  cautious  policy  stance  at  ECB  may  be  its 
self-imposed policy mandate in that the reference rate of desirable inflation is ―below 
but close to 2%‖ in contrast to the Bank of England target of 2%, with a symmetric 
tolerance band upward and downward. The inflation rate in mid-2008 was still running 
high in Europe, UK, and US because of commodity price increases in the preceding 
year.   
 
At the beginning of the current global crisis, Japan had the lowest policy interest rate, 
because  it  had  just  got  out  from  deflation.    As  the  CPI  inflation  rate  had  become 
positive, the Bank of Japan cautiously raised the policy rate (call rate) in 2006 from 
0.0%  to  0.25%,  to  0.5%.    Just  when  the  economy  was  out  of  deflation,  the  shock 
occurred and the economy seemed to be entering deflation again. The Bank of Japan cut 
the interest rate in October 2008 by 0.2 percentage point to 0.3 %, and again by the 
same  amount  to  0.1%  in  December  2008.    At  the  same  time,  the  Bank  of  Japan 
introduced interest payment to excess reserves.    The policy rate that is equal to the 
interest rate of the excess reserve, so that the rate forms the floor in the interbank rate.   
Therefore this is virtually zero interest rate policy, but with the rate only slightly above 
zero. As of September 2009, the inflation rate (excluding fresh food) is about negative 
2%, so that the real interest rate has become definitely positive. Therefore, Japan is 
again  suffering  from  a  deflation  problem  and  the  zero  interest  rate  as  the  binding 
constraint.    The policy rate cuts by the four major central banks are shown in Figure 3.   
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
(b) Monetary Policy beyond ZIRP 
In  the  previous  episode  of  the  zero  interest  rate  policy  (ZIRP),  the  Bank  of  Japan 
targeted the balance of current account (essentially excess reserves). However, in this 14 
 
crisis, this approach was not taken.    See the later subsection on the difference between 
quantitative easing and credit easing.   
 
When all four central banks reached virtually zero interest rate, is there any role for 
monetary policy?    This question was asked and answered in the context of finding 
tools to get out of deflation, before during the Japanese ZIRP experiences. Many studied 
the experiences of Japan and some provided advices to the Bank of Japan.   
 
In the pre-Lehman environment, the Federal Reserve was well-prepared to combat the 
burst of housing bubble and deflationary impact.    Chairman Bernanke and FRB staff 
had studied what happened in Japan and understood various options to combat deflation.   
(See Bernanke (1983) on the Great Depression.) Ahearne et al. (2002), Bernanke (2003) 
and  Clouse  (2000)  studied  and  discussed  the  Japanese  experiences  and  discussed 
unconventional instruments. Bernanke (2002) showed some confidence that deflation in 
the United States in the post-tech bubble burst would be avoided, and Bernanke (2003) 
argued that Japan could find ways to expand its balance sheet even at the zero interest 
rate, although he expressed sympathy to a concern of possible deterioration on the asset 
side, that could be helped by assurance from the Ministry of Finance.       
 
Among the academics, Krugman (1998) offered an advice of generating expectation of 
higher-than-usual inflation rate during the phase of deflation so that the expected real 
interest rate would become lower. Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) analyzed the issue 
of optimal monetary policy under the zero bound of the interest rate. They argue the 
importance of communication for commitment on the future interest rate path. Svensson 
(2001) provided a policy prescription for Japan that involves unsterilized intervention 
with a depreciated level of target exchange rate. The foolproof way of getting out of 
deflation is based on export promotion and imported inflation. However, with global 
ZIRP,  Svensson’s  proposal  would  not  work,  as  it  would  become  global 
beggar-thy-neighbor policy.     
 
(c) Expectation Management 
At the point of effective ZIRP, there still remains an important aspect of conventional 
monetary policy, namely inflation expectation management.    For the inflation targeter 
like  the  Bank  of  England,  maintaining  the  inflation  target  and  communicating  the 
intention of achieving it in medium-term, as usual, may still act as an anchor.    In fact, 
the fan chart of the Bank of England had shown almost always achievement of 2% 15 
 
target, with high probability, in its two-to three-year horizon. However, in the height of 
the current crisis, namely Inflation Report of November 2008 and February 2009, the 
fan chart, based on market interest rate expectations, showed that achieving the 2% 
target, even after three years, would be quite unlikely.  The most likely projection was 
at around 1% inflation rate by end 2011, as shown in Figure 4 (reproduced from the 
Bank of England, Inflation Report). This posed a quite difficult situation for the central 
bank.    Did  the  Bank  of  England  abandon  inflation  targeting?  Or  has  the  Bank  of 
England become incompetent in achieving the target?     
 
Insert Figure 4A about here 
 
The Bank of England started to purchase high quality securities, including Gilt in March, 
and the ceiling of purchase would be increased gradually.
5  By August 2009 inflation 
report, the fan chart was able to show that 2% target would be achieved by mid-2011 on 
the assumption that the policy rate is to be maintained at 0.5% and asset purchases of 
₤175 billion to be maintained. This is shown in Figure 4B. The Bank of England took 
advantage of Inflation Report to anchor expectations, and employ unconventional policy 
of asset purchase was integrated in  the framework of inflation targeting.  With the 
inflation targeting  framework, a transition  from conventional to  unconventional  was 
easily  communicated  (―without  unconventional  policy,  inflation  target  cannot  be 
achieved‖), and it would be easy to rationalize when time comes for exit (―even without 
quantitative easing, inflation target will be achieved.‖)   
 
Insert Figure 4B about here 
 
Expectation management posed a similar problem at Federal Reserve. Although it is not 
an inflation targeter, the inflation rate between 1% and 2% was considered to be an 
appropriate. (Chairman Bernanke once called this rage as a comfort zone.) The Federal 
Reserve does not publish Inflation Report, but it produces the distribution of FOMC 
members’ personal forecasts. Forecasts are shown twice a year at the time of Monetary 
Policy  Report  to  Congress  (formerly,  Hamphrey-Hawkins  testimony).  In  February 
Report (polls taken in January), the lower bound of the range of forecasts became lower 
than 1 percent even in the three year horizon (forecasts for 2011). It must be more than 
                                                   
5  The Bank of England announced to introduce Asset Purchase Facility in January 2009.    The Bank 
started to purchase of high quality securities, including Gilt in March.    The amount increased from 
₤2.5 billion in March 2009 to ₤158.4 billion in October 1, 2009. 16 
 
just a coincidence that from this report, the ―long-run‖ forecasts were surveyed, where 
long-run forecasts are defined as: ―Longer-run projections represent each participant's 
assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under 
appropriate  monetary  policy  and  in  the  absence  of  further  shocks  to  the  economy‖ 
(footnote of the table of projection, with emphasis being added by the present author). 
This language is very close to those under the inflation targeting regime. The long-run 
projection  shows  the  central  tendency  of  [1.7,  2.0],  while  the  range  was  [1.5,  2.0]. 
Federal  Reserve regarded that this  step was  important  in  managing  expectation  and 
communication to  the public. That  is  the precisely the point of having a numerical 
inflation target.    It seems that the Federal Reserve is now a step closer to adopting 
inflation targeting without declaring so explicitly. 
 
The Bank of Japan that publishes the Monetary Policy committee members’ forecasts 
twice a year had the forecast in April publication.    According to the forecasts for Fiscal 
Year 2010, the central tendency (trimming the max an min) is [-1.1, -0.8] and forecasts 
of all members is [-1.2, -0.4].    There is no long-run forecasts in the table, and any sign 
of expectation management to get out of deflation is visible in the document. [Next 
publication of the document will be at the end of October.]     
 
The summary of the four central bank policies is shown in Table 2. Each central bank 
has its own way to conduct conventional and unconventional monetary policy under 
virtually zero interest rate environment. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
3.2.  Unconventional Monetary Policy:    QE vs CE 
(a) Term Liquidity Provision and Asset Purchase 
ECB started the liquidity provision in the aftermath of the Lehman failure.    Its policy 
of enhancing credit provision and its effects on the spread are examined in Čihák, 
Harjes, and Stavrev (2009). Their conclusion is that the ECB transmission continued to 
operate during the global crisis.    Lengthening of the maturity of monetary policy 
operations and the provision of liquidity at the fixed rate reduced money market term 
spreads and facilitated the policy to work. They also interpreted that the substantial 
increase in the ECB’s balance sheet may have contributed to a reduction in the 
government bond term spreads.   17 
 
ECB announced on May 7, 2009, to start purchasing euro-denominated covered bonds 
issued in the euro area.    The Governing Council of the ECB decided the technical 
modality on June 4.    The purchase would start in July and the target amount would be 
EUR 60 billion to be completed by June 2010. The purchase will be directly from 
primary and secondary markets. The high grade (AA or above) is preferred and 
underlying assets that include exposure to private and/or public entities.       
(b) QE vs CE 
The similarity and difference between quantitative easing (QE), adopted by the Bank of 
Japan from 2001 to 2006, and credit easing (CE) of Federal Reserve is explained by 
Bernanke (2009 Jan) himself.
6  Let me first paraphrase his points (all quoted 
statements in the following several paragraphs are his). The similarity between QE and 
CE is an expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet. But the difference is that which 
side of the central bank’s balance sheet is in the policy focus. The (pure form of) QE 
emphasizes the liability side, while the focus of CE is the composition of central bank’s 
assets.   
As the policy target, the Bank of Japan replaced the call rate with the amount of current 
account at the Bank of Japan, that is, essentially the excess reserve of the financial 
institutions. The asset side, that is the composition of loans and securities, is ―incidental.‖   
The Federal Reserve’s CE ―focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and 
on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households and 
businesses.‖    The difference, Bernanke explains, stems from the difference in financial 
and economic conditions of Japan, 2001-2006 and the U.S. 2008: ―credit spreads are 
much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than was 
the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing.‖ The stated policy 
objective of FED CE is ―reducing those spreads and improving the functioning of 
private credit markets more generally‖ 
                                                   
6  ―Our approach--which could be described as "credit easing"--resembles quantitative easing in one 
respect:   It involves an expansion of the central bank's balance sheet.   However, in a pure QE 
regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which are liabilities of the central bank; 
the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet is 
incidental.   Indeed, although the Bank of Japan's policy approach during the QE period was quite 
multifaceted, the overall stance of its policy was gauged primarily in terms of its target for bank 
reserves.   In contrast, the Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and 
securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households 
and businesses.‖ Bernanke (2009, Jan) 18 
 
When QE was adopted in March 2001, the transmission channels from expanding the 
central bank balance sheet to stimulating economic activities were controversial.    First, 
flooding the market with liquidity stabilizes the banking system by erasing fear that a 
bank may fail due to a lack of liquidity (as opposed to insolvency).    Second, QE may 
reduce the long rates, if it contributes to forming an expectation of lower short rates in 
the future, and the long rates is more relevant to stimulating investment activities. The 
expectation of future ZIRP is strengthened by clarification of the strict exit condition. 
This channel is called ―policy duration effect.‖    Third, QE may encourage financial 
institutions to take more risks, by lending to less credit-worthy customers or by 
purchasing riskier securities, including equities and foreign-currency denominated 
securities. That would have effects to raise the stock prices and depreciate the yen, as 
well as keeping SMEs alive, encouraging venture capital to spring up, and making it 
easier to restructure non-performing loans. This can be called the bank lending channel. 
Fourth, risk-taking behavior among institutional investors and retail customers, may 
increase due to looser lending policy of banks. Again, equities and foreign currency 
denominated securities are likely choices. Thus, QE were a commitment strategy 
creating expectation of sustained ZIRP, might have encouraged ―carry-trade‖ and 
depreciate the yen. 
In the last line of thinking, Svensson (2001) advocated a foolproof way of stimulating 
the economy under ZIRP by conducting the targeted depreciation of the currency 
backed by unlimited unsterilized intervention. Although Japan engaged in massive 
intervention from January 2003 to March 2004, in parallel with expansion of the Bank 
of Japan balance sheet, both the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan would deny 
their embracing Svensson’s advice.    (Deputy Governor Iwata once mentioned, in 
response to newspaper reporter question, that the intervention and QE were purely a 
coincidence.)   
What are the assessments of the effectiveness of various QE transmission channels.   
There is near consensus that it contributed to financial stability and that policy duration 
effect also worked.    Many agree that BOJ-QE of 2001-06 with committed (non-)exit 
strategy had a ―policy duration‖ effect and contributed to flattening of the yield curve. 
(See Ito (2004; RBA) for controversies in Japan over adoption of QE, non-adoption of 
inflation targeting, and effectiveness of QE. See Oda and Ueda (2005) for policy 
duration effects.)    There is some evidence of the yen depreciation through carry-trade, 
but it would be difficult to assess an incremental effect of QE beyond ZIRP.    Most 
controversial is the bank lending channel.    There is little evidence, empirical or 19 
 
anecdotal, that banks lent more because of QE.    Banks were worried about their 
liquidity positions and Basle capital ratio in 2002-2003. (The core capital of major 
banks was steadily eroded from 1999, when capital injection fattened their capital, to 
2002, and they found that large proportion of their tier I was replaced by ―tax deferred 
assets.‖ The new FSA minister Takenaka, in October 2002, threatened banks to raise 
capital or otherwise. He was reported to have said that ―No Bank is Too Big to Fail.‖) 
The banks were not making more loans, just because of increased QE in 2002-2003.   
In the credit easing policy, the focus is to restore a dysfunctional bank credit market and 
to restore the market mechanism in the securities market. This can be better analyzed in 
the  framework  of  credit  channel  of  monetary  policy,  rather  than  the  conventional 
interest rate channel, if such a distinction is appropriate. The credit channel, as surveyed 
in  Bernanke,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1999),  emphasizes  the  bank  lending  and  firms 
behavior of the usage of the funds in profitable projects. The credit channel is often 
powerful  in  explaining  the  linkage  between  credit  quality,  bank  health,  and  firms’ 
available resources, and creating business cycles due to bank credit availability. If the 
current global crisis is an extreme form of business downturn, rather than as a result of 
some structural breaks, the credit channel model must have a good explanatory power in 
explanation. Indeed, the large movement of various market interest rate spreads, such as 
TED spread  and  Libor-OIS can be interpreted  broadly  as the  credit problem in  the 
banking sector that affects bank lending.     
 
One of the objectives of credit easing is to restore a normal spread in the credit market. 
How  monetary  policy  responds  to  the  heightened  credit  spread  and  whether  the 
monetary policy could influence the spread is a topic of recent investigation.
7     
Bernanke (2009, Jan) argues that it is not possible to set a single number as policy 
objective in the regime of credit easing, as it is more driven by demands.  He admits 
that this poses a communication challenge. He declares that more transparency about 
the condition and plan of how the balance sheet is used for credit easing.   
                                                   
7  Taylor (2008) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) investigated whether a central bank should 
respond to the market credit spreads.    By modifying the conventional Taylor rule to include the 
credit spread, Taylor showed that the Fed action of rapid easing in the current crisis can be better 
explained. This was named spread-adjusted Taylor rule. Sudo and Teranishi (2008) and Teranishi 
(2009) showed that under some circumstances, the spread-adjusted Taylor rule is an optimal 
monetary policy rule. In particular, Teranishi (2009) showed that the spread-adjusted Taylor rule is 
an optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous loan interest rate contracts in both discretionary 
and commitment strategy, and that a commitment policy is effective in narrowing the credit spread 
when the central bank hits the zero lower bound constraint. 20 
 
I have three observations and interpretations of the difference between QE and CE.   
First, since the effectiveness of the BOJ QE in the 2001-2006 episode is somewhat 
controversial, this might have been a consideration in Bernanke’s choice of the name of 
FRB policy being different from QE, but that did not stop Governor King of Bank of 
England to name his policy quantitative easing.    Second, the mid-term and long-term 
rates came down and that must have positive stimulating effect on the economy.    A 
similar effect can be achieved if expectation of sustained ZIRP—even after the time 
point that the regular policy rule would prescribe the rate rise—can be managed with 
different communication method (without expanding the central bank’s balance sheet.     
Third, the acute difficulty in the financial and capital market, similar to the US markets 
post-Lehman months, existed in Japan after a major bank, and one large and one 
medium-size securities firms failed in November 1997. The Japanese banks suffered 
from humiliating Japan premium, a widened spread for Japanese banks in the dollar 
interbank markets.    Widespread credit crunch was also reported. Since Japan was and 
still has a more bank-based financial system than the United States, credit crunch had a 
major impact on the economy. Purchasing various securities, similar to CE, would have 
had little impact on easing problem. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the Bank of 
Japan could have done CE-like opearations in the wake of the banking crisis of 
November 1997, but probably not in 2001-06.    Fourth, although Chairman Bernanke 
dismisses the importance of the asset side considerations of the Bank of Japan QE, the 
scope of collateral was expanded, including corporate bonds and commercial papers.   
The Bank of Japan also purchased more than 2 trillion yen worth of equities from 
commercial banks, but the Bank stressed that it was not a part of monetary policy but 
for the systemic stability.
8   
 
(c) Governance 
Unconventional monetary policy also posed  weakness in  governance of the Federal 
Reserve  Board  and  Federal  Reserve  System.  In  the  crisis  environment  after  the 
Lehman’s failure, several facilities were created and some important decisions were 
made at the Federal Reserve Board. Many ―facilities‖ to provide financial institutions 
with liquidity fell into a category of unconventional policy. They were not monetary 
policy that was conducted by FOMC (Governors and regional Federal Reserve Bank 
President),  but  policy  that  was  decided  by  Governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
(FRB).    Specifically, discounts for individuals, partnerships, and corporations can be 
                                                   
8  See Ito (2004: p.239) for detailed accounts of the Bank of Japan policy. 21 
 
determined by the Governors at FRB alone:    ―In unusual and exigent circumstances, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not 
less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as 
the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of 
section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount for any individual, partnership, or 
corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of 
exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve 
bank‖ (Federal Reserve Act, Section 13 (3).)    Therefore, as monetary policy moved 
from  conventional  to  unconventional  policy,  the  power  shifted  away  from  regional 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents.    In light of needs for quick responses, this may be 
desirable.    However, it posed some governance question and transparency question (no 
minutes available for Section 13-3 decitions) in the Federal Reserve System.   
 
3.3.  Should Lehman Brothers have been saved? 
The success of crisis management in March 2008 in reaction to Bear Stearns collapse 
became a medium-term curse. It generated moral hazard among investors and banks that 
the counterparty risk is small, since the government would arrange a rescue merger. In 
particular, many market participants and observers come to believe that a too-big-to-fail 
would apply to investment banks that are larger than Bear Stearns.    It also generated 
complacency  among  the  regulators  in  that  another  crisis  may  be  averted,  if  it  ever 
happened.   
 
After  Bear  Stearns  was  rescued  with  assistance  from  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the 
Treasury,  the  market  maintained  calm  although  with  higher-than-normal  spread  for 
various  risk.    US  and  European  financial  institutions  were  deleveraging  quickly  to 
shrink  the  balance  sheets.    The  crisis  originated  from  the  United  States,  and  most 
adverse consequences were concentrated in the United States.    Policy responses were 
on  the  conventional  monetary  policy,  lowering  the  interest  rate.  However,  several 
unconventional  policy  responses  were  also  employed:    creation  of  Term  Auction 
Facility (TAF) in December 2007; rescue operation of Bear Stearns  and creation of 
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCD) in 
March  2008;  and  explicit  government  guarantee  of  GSE.    These  were  remarkable 
developments in the category of unconventional monetary policy in the pre-Lehman 
period.   
 
Bear Stearns in March 2008 had two important changes to the market sentiments. First, 22 
 
many market participants and observers were surprised that investment banks are in 
serious financial conditions. Second, the rescue merger arranged by the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve gave assurance that the Treasury and the Fed were prepared to take 
extraordinary  actions  to  prevent  an  outright  demise  of  financial  institutions. 
Counterparties would be protected and no financial domino would occur. The relatively 
small reaction of spreads (as explained in the preceding section, Timeline) attests the 
description.   
 
With all the  indications, a collapse of  Lehman Brothers was  a watershed.    Clearly, 
what had happened after the collapse was not the best outcome that the financial policy 
was  supposed  to  produce.  Putting  it  more  bluntly,  letting  Lehman  Brothers  file  for 
Chapter 11 was a mistake. 
 
However, many observers differ on what should have been done and what could have 
been  in  what  timeframe.    Below  I  summarize  some  of  the  arguments  critical  of 
Treasury-Fed policy and defense of the policy (based on my conversation with those 
informed).   
 
Naïve criticism  (from lender-of-last-resort believer) would go as  follows:  Given  the 
financial turmoil that was caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it should have 
been saved by a Bear-Stearns like rescue merger.    It was too rigid to say ―no assistance 
from the government this time.‖    Ultimate costs to taxpayers, in an attempt to avert 
financial collapse after the Lehman’s failure, turned out to be much larger than the 
amount  of  assistance  that  the  government  would  be  required  to  give  to  a  potential 
financial institution to merge Lehman.   
 
Defense of the Treasure-Fed actions would go as follows: There are three differences 
between Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. First, deterioration of the Bear Stearns 
liquidity position took place suddenly, so Bear Stearns did not have time to cope with 
the change in financial environment and the regulators were caught off guard. So, it was 
justified to take an extraordinary action of loss guarantee.    Second, after the rescue 
merger of Bear Stearns, TSLF and PDCF were introduced so that a mechanism was 
there that Lehman could help itself. Third, a line had to be drawn somewhere to avoid 
moral hazard.   
 
Further criticism to this line defense would go as follows:: It may be true that Lehman 23 
 
Brothers management was at fault, but the management failure or not should not be a 
criterion  to  for  rescuing  an  institution  or  not.    ―Moral  hazard‖  might  be  evident 
because the Bear Stearns rescue created a notion that any investment bank larger than 
Bear Stearns (no. 5) would be rescued. No counterparty risk.    The Treasury and Fed 
were to ―draw a line,‖ it should have done so immediately after the rescue of Bear 
Stearns,  emphasizing  it  had  been  an  exceptional  case  and  would  not  be  under  no 
circumstances repeated. Instead, policy shift toward preventing moral hazard seems to 
have occurred implicitly only after the Bear Stearns handling was criticized. When the 
Treasury entered negotiation with financial institutions (Bank of America and Barclays) 
that  expressed  interest  in  taking  over  Lehman  brothers  just  several  days  before  the 
weekend  of  September  13,  the  potential  suitors  must  have  believed  that  similar 
sweeteners would be added to the rescue deal. 
 
By  asserting  ―moral  hazard‖—no  sweetener—the  Treasury  created  financial  chaos 
following  the  Lehman’s  filing  chapter  11.    Then  the  Treasury  and  the  Fed  had  to 
provide all sorts of lifeboats to many institutions: AIG, CitiGroup, Bank of America.   
 
Even if the Lehman Brothers was to fail, either because of lack of enough collaterals or 
insolvency, chapter 11 was the worst form of failing a financial institution.    Under 
Chapter 11, the bankruptcy court freezes assets, while the institution is protected from 
creditors.    First, all the claims to the institution will be categorized and sorted out for 
priority before they started to  be returned.    The particular aspect  of this  temporary 
freeze on liability payments, especially short-term liabilities and liabilities due to swap, 
derivative, collateral and consignment contracts—basically customers’ assets in care of 
the securities firm, was the source of financial domino effects. Many of the financial 
difficulties experienced by other investment banks, institutional investors, and hedge 
funds rooted in this freeze of assets and protection from creditors.     
 
There is another international dimension to this failure.  Immediately after Lehman’s 
filing  of  Chapter  11  in  the  United  States,  its  subsidiaries  filed  similar 
bankruptcy/rehabilitation plan in Japan and UK.    Accordingly,      financial regulators 
of Japan, and UK ordered that the Lehman’s subsidiaries assets to be frozen in the 
boundary  of  each  country,  fearing  de  facto  siphoning  assets  from  each  country  to 
headquarters.    Bankruptcy laws in the three countries are different in  details and it 
became difficult for a subsidiary to resolve the organization within each jurisdiction.   
Japanese assets that belonged to customers but in swap arrangements with New York or 24 
 
with London faced difficulties in unwinding.   
 
In bankruptcy law, proprietary trading and trading accounts for customers are separated 
and the latter is fully protected in bankrupted securities firms (investment bank), it took 
months to return those assets to customers.    Days may be too late for some of the 
institutional  investors  that  face  redemption  and  withdrawal  of  funds  form  retail 
customers. 
 
Considering all these difficulties that ensued, it would have been much better for the 
financial markets that the government takes over, i.e., nationalize, Lehman Brothers.   
The new government-run institution would be able to honors short-term liabilities, to 
unwind swap arrangement, and to return assets of customers in consignment, within 
days if not hours.   
 
Defense of the government action would say that there was no legal framework for the 
government to take over a financial institution like that.    However, rebut is possible.   
First, the fact that a majority share of AIG was acquired by the government very quickly, 
de facto nationalization, shows that it seems possible for the government to take over a 
(near-)insolvent financial institution, if the government is determined to do so.    Second, 
more  fundamentally,  the  six  months  from  the  Bear  Stearns  rescue  to  the  Lehman’s 
chapter 11 had to be spent in regulatory and legal reform to make such a government 
takeover of a seriously troubled institution possible.   
 
3.4.  Bank Restructuring: Conventional Wisdom and Practices 
A rich literature exists on how to manage and exit from the banking crisis, once the 
crisis erupted.
9  The best practices have been learnt from the experiences of the US 
Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s; the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s; the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998; and the Japanese banking crisis in 2007 -2003, to 
name a few. 
 
When a bank is short in liquidity, providing liquidity by accepting wider range of 
collateral is a first step. When the counterparty risk is hiked for some reasons, the 
liquidity provision by the central bank is not uncommon. In the extreme case, providing 
liquidity becomes a lender-of-last-resort operation. An important point here is that the 
                                                   
9  To name a few, Caprio, et al. (1998), Hausmann and Rojas-Suárez, (1996), Ito and Hashimoto 
(2007) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 25 
 
central bank has to be sure that shortage is in liquidity, not in capital. The liquidity crisis 
can  be  helped  by  liquidity  provision,  but  the  insolvency  crisis  (capital  becoming 
negative) cannot be helped by liquidity provision. During the acute crisis, it is very 
difficult to differentiate the two. In many times in history, liquidity provision was used 
time  to  time  in  many  countries,  sometimes  successfully  and  sometimes  resulting  in 
insolvency. In the current global crisis, many ―facilities‖ created by Federal Reserve fall 
into this category. European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan also 
expanded asset purchases from the market and from commercial banks directly, helping 
liquidity to banks, but the magnitude was much less than Federal Reserve. 
 
When a crisis is caused by deteriorating asset quality, a different solution  has to be 
sought. If writing off non-performing loans and valuation losses from assets become 
significant  compared  to  capital  of  the  bank,  the  government  can  inject  capital,  by 
subscribing to subordinated debts or purchasing new issues of common shares, to the 
troubled  bank.    Capital  injection  was  tried  twice  in  Japanese  banking  crisis  of 
1997-1998, and in the current global crisis in many countries.
10  The problem in capital 
injection is that the government tends to be shy away from taking management control , 
while helping banks gaining breathing space. Precisely because the government does 
not take control, banks tend not to take drastic reform measures. If the government tries 
to put too stringent restriction, no bank applies for it (also a stigma issue).   So, the 
government tends to force several major banks—strong or weak in capital position—to 
accept capital injection. This was the case in March 1998 in Japan, and October 14, 
2008 in the United States.    However, if a stringent condition is imposed (like a cap on 
executive bonuses), banks will repay injected capital quickly, whether they may still 
need it.    This happened in the United States in the current crisis. Capital injection has a 
side  effect,  that  banks  may  not  take  a  serious  reform  effort,  like  writing  off 
nonperforming loans aggressively, or separating bad assets to a bad bank (collection 
agencies). This was the case in Japan from 1999 to 2002, when complacency eroded 
true capital.    The United States  also  failed to  convince banks  to  take advantage  of 
TARP precisely because banks did not find it advantageous to sell assets in fire sale 
prices.     
 
Blanket  guarantee  of  deposits  are  often  necessary  to  avoid  a  bank  run.    Japan 
introduced a blanket  guarantee in  as  early  as  1995, while the serious crisis  did  not 
happen until 1997.    Even during the protracted banking crisis, there was no bank run in 
                                                   
10  See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000) for the experiences of the Japanese banks. 26 
 
Japan.    United Kingdom hesitated to provide a blanket guarantee when Northern Rock 
became known to have fragility in the fall of 2007. The ceiling for full guarantee was 
rather low, and a bank run occurred against Northern Rock until it was nationalized in 
February 2008. This was a costly episode eroding confidence in financial regulators. 
During  the  Asian  crisis,  Indonesia  closed  sixteen  banks  without  full  guarantees  of 
deposits, and that causes bank run and capital flight.
11  In the global crisis, Sweden 
increased  the  ceiling  of  deposit  guarantees  to  SEK  500,000  on  October  6,  and 
Switzerland did the same up to CHF 100,000 on November 5. On October 5, the 
German government guaranteed all private bank deposits. On September 30, deposits in 
six  large  banks  in  Ireland  were  guaranteed  by  the  government,  and  this  was  an 
enhancement from a deposit insurance ceiling of EUR 100,000 only ten days earlier.    
 
Not only deposits but other liabilities of banks can be guaranteed by the govern ment if 
and when counterparty risk becomes too high. In order to maintain the interbank market 
and to avoid systemic risk, guarantee of liabilities, new and old, may be provided.  In 
the current crisis, the German government and SoFFin (financial stabiliza tion fund) 
used guarantees to several large institutions.    
 
When a financial institution is near or in the state of insolvency, in many cases, the 
government prefers to take over and restructure it to leave it to be liquidated it. A large 
financial institution shutting the operation suddenly (or applying for bankruptcy and its 
assets being frozen) increases the risk of systemic risks and financial domino. This was 
actually what happened in the case of Lehman’s filing Chapter 11 (see later section for 
this discussion).    Nationalization makes it possible to resolve an institution without 
causing stress to creditors of short-term assets, counterparty of derivatives, while it is 
possible to hold shareholders and management responsible.    Hesitation on the part of 
the government is also understandable.    Outright nationalization may invite criticisms 
of too much intervention into the free market, of incompetence of the government in 
running a large complex bank, and of possible conflict of interest, if the government or 
public  corporations  are  borrowers  from  the  bank.    However,  nationalization  has  an 
advantage to exercise drastic reforms in selling non-core assets quickly, lowering wages 
and  legacy  costs,  and  possibly  separating  distressed  assets  to  a  bad  bank.   
Nationalization and separating bad assets worked in S&L crisis in the United States, in 
the Japanese banking crisis from 1997 to 2003, in the Asian financial crisis (Korea, 
                                                   
11  See Ito (2007) for a critical review of the ―prior condition‖ for the IMF program for Indonesia in 
October 31, 1997. 27 
 
Indonesia, and Thailand).     
 
It  is  well  recognized  that  separating  distressed  assets—nonperforming  loans  in  the 
Japanese context and toxic assets in the US context—is a key to revive health of banks 
in trouble.    However, it is very difficult to convince banks to sell distressed assets to 
the  private  equity  fund  or  government-sponsored  bad  bank  (or  fund),  unless  the 
government has a strong stick, or threat of nationalization. Sometimes, actual (not just a 
threat of) nationalization is needed to arrive at a good bank-bad bank solution.
12  This 
was shown true in the S&L crisis in the 1980s; Nordic crisis of the early 1990s; and the 
Indonesian, Thai, and Korean crisis in 1997-98.   
 
The failure to use Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) money in the United States 
for its original purposes is the lack of stick in the hands of the government to forc e 
banks to sell toxic assets.  Valuation is inherently difficult when markets for those 
securities had virtually disappeared. The gap of pricing between sellers’ wish and buyers’ 
responsibility to taxpayer could not have been bridged. If the banking fragility is to 
continue in the United States, hesitation in nationalization, however temporary it might 
have been, that made difficult to force separation of toxic assets will be identified as one 
of the reasons,.   
 
3.5.  Summary 
My major assessments of the policy responses are as follows:   
(1)  Credit easing, as well as conventional policy, by Fed has been very successful in 
avoiding the worst possible situation—a meltdown of the financial markets—in the 
wake of Lehman Brothers’ failure. 
(2)  Various unconventional measures employed by European financial authorities were 
effective in providing liquidities averting large scale financial problems. Some of 
early nationalization and liability guarantees maintained systemic stability.   
(3)  Although unconventional policies had high costs, they established evidence that 
during the crisis, they are well spent in avoiding a financial disaster.   
(4)  Letting the Lehman Brothers file for Chapter 11 was a mistake. But, what should 
have been done needs careful discussion. Six months between March  2008 and 
September 2008 should have been used not only for firefighting, but an institutional 
overhaul in anticipation of some large, complex institution may become (virtually) 
                                                   
12  Schäfer and Zimmermann (2009) argues that ―bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives 
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insolvent.   
(5)  The  inflation  targeting  is  an  effective  tool  for  expectation  management  andn 
communication even during the phase of    ZIRP.       
 
 
4.  Remaining Challenges 
As  argued  in  the  end  of  Section  2,  the  financial  markets  and  institutions  regained 
normalcy  in  terms  of  risk  spreads  and  CDS  premium.    However,  this  may  be  still 
dependent on various conventional and unconventional monetary policies. How to exit 
from ZIRP, CE/QE, and all other guarantees and injected capital is obviously a difficult 
challenge in coming months.    However, to err on the side of late exit would be prudent 
given what the market experienced since September 2008. Still deflation may be more 
of a risk than inflation.    A critic may point out that the last episode of keeping the 
interest rate low in the aftermath of the tech bubble burst might have sown the seed of 
housing bubble. (Taylor (2009).)  Therefore, exit must not be delayed. However, at this 
moment  there  is  no  sign  of  another  bubble  to  form  due  to  ZIRP.    The  worry  is 
misguided. Of course, as a long-run issue, it is important to examine whether and how 
money policy should respond to asset prices.   
 
One of the main reasons for the subprime crisis in the United States was its antiquated 
regulatory  framework—fragmented,  duplicated,  but  with  cracks.    Investment  banks 
were  not  effectively  regulated  by  SEC,  and  multiple  regulators  invited  regulatory 
arbitrage.    Currently,  it  is  proposed  to  give  more  power  to  Federal  Reserve  in 
supervising  systemically  important  financial  institutions.    The  issue  of  whether  an 
integrated supervisor, FSA, is effective in regulation and supervision, or a central bank 
should  play  a  large  role  in  supervision  has  been  debated  in  policy  circles.    United 
Kingdom,  Japan,  Australia  and  Korea,  among  others  chose  a  model  of  FSA,  while 
several continental European countries have a hybrid of federal regulator and national 
central bank. 
 
When normalcy in the financial market is restored and the supervision framework is 
straightened  out,  a  fundamental  question  of  how  to  avoid  ―too  big  to  fail‖  while 
systemic stability is maintained has to be debated in the international arena. In order to 
avoid too big to fail, the government has to have a tool to nationalize a large, complex, 
internationally-active  financial  institution  for  orderly  resolution.  However,  if  the 
government-led resolution frameworks for Europe, US and Asia are not coordinated, the 29 
 
resolution  becomes  difficult  (recall  the  difficulty  caused  by  Chapter  11  and 
corresponding frameworks in US, UK and Japan for the Lehman resolution). 
 
Now that G20 becomes a permanent forum for discussing financial architecture, the 
leadership  in  G20  is  needed  to  steer  discussions  into  a  direction  of  relevance.   
Engaging important emerging market economies is important, but 20 may be too large a 
number for effective discussion.     
 
IMF is again criticized that it may overlook signs of vulnerability among emerging 
markets  that  are  now  under  its  program—Iceland,  Hungary,  Belarus,  and  Latvia,  to 
name a few.    Could it be ever possible to make an early warning?    The call for early 
warning was heard in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994, again after the Asian 
crisis, and this time.    If every crisis is different, it is almost impossible to predict a 
crisis.    On the other hand, too much short term debt in comparison to foreign reserves 
seems  to  be  a  robust  indicator  for  vulnerability.    This  was  recognized  by  Asian 
countries  and  they  have  piled  up  foreign  reserves  since  2000.  It  seems  their 
accumulating  foreign  reserves,  however  costly  in  terms  of  fiscal  operation,  are 
worthwhile in avoiding any crisis in East Asia in the current global crisis.   
 
G20 and IMF should shift a focus to establishing a global resolution mechanism for a 
large, complex, internationally-active financial institution in order to avoid moral hazard, 
while maintaining the systemic stability. This is the most important lesson from the 
Lehman’s  filing  for  Chapter  11,  and  the  most  important  lesson  for  global  financial 
supervision and regulation in the future.   
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Table 1:    Overview of Commitments and Outlays of Rescuing Banks (Panetta (2009, table 1.2) 
   




























Australia  Commitments      Uns          Uns  Uns  Uns 
    Outlays      62          62  10.4  4.6 
Canada  Commitments      Uns          UNs  Uns  Uns 
    Outlays      0                     
France  Commitments  43  320      5  368  18.9  4.8 
    Outlays  28  72      5  104  5.3  1.4 
Germany  Commitments  80  420  Uns  200  700  28.1  8.9 
    Outlays  22  129  0  0  151  6.1  1.9 
Italy  Commitments  20  Uns          Uns  Uns  Uns 
    Outlays  10  0          10  0.6  0.3 
Japan  Commitments  105      8      113  2.7  0.9 
    Outlays  3      0      3  0.1  0 
Netherlands  Commitments  37  200      28  265  44.6  11.9 
    Outlays  31  40      28  99  16.6  4.4 
Spain  Commitments  Uns  100          Uns  Uns  Uns 
    Outlays  0  31          31  2.8  0.9 
Switzerland  Commitments  4  Uns  27      Uns  Uns  Uns 
    Outlays  4  0  27      31  8.7  1.5 
United 
Kingdom 
Commitments  54  269      523  845  54  10.8 
    Outlays  54  113      523  690  44.1  8.8 
United 
States 
Commitments  335  1760  115  281  2491  22.3  25.5 
    Outlays  237  271  36  281  825  7.4  8.4 
Total of 11 
countries 
Commitments  677  3131  150  1036  4994  18.8  8.3 
    Outlays  387  719  64  836  2006  7.6  3.3 
Source: Panetta et al. (2009: Table 1.2., p. 13) 
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Figure 4A:  Bank of England,  CPI inflation projection based on market interest rate expectations 
 








Table 2: Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy among FRB, ECB, BOJ, and BOE 
  FRB  ECB  BOJ  BOE 
Policy  rates,  June 
2007 => Dec 2008 






Virtual ZIRP  December 2008  May 2009  December 2008  March 2009 
QE/CE  CE  QE(?)  QE(?)  QE 
Expectation 
management 
FOMC member forecasts; 
Lengthening horizon 





yes  no  Yes, expanded  Yes, introduced  
Other 
unconventional 
Many facilities  Covered bonds  CP, CB  Asset purchases. 
Governance  FOMC for FF rate 
Board for CE 
Governing Council   MPM  for  both  monetary 
policy  and  financial 
stability policy 
MPC  
Other  relevant 
parties  
Treasury;  other 
organizations 
National  central 
banks  and  fiscal 
authorities 
MOF and FSA  Tripartite  with  HM  Treasury  
and FSA 
 